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JUSTICE BYRNES AND THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
WILLIAM PZTTIT*
Because of its length and the work it embraced, the judicial career
of James F. Byrnes on the Supreme Court of the United States is
one of the most unusual careers in judicial history. When Justice
McReynolds of Tennessee resigned from the court in 1941, Presi-
dent Roosevelt nominated Mr. Byrnes, a Democrat and senator from
South Carolina, to fill the vacancy. The nomination was sent to the
United States Senate on June 12 and on the same day, the Senate
confirmed the appointment. Justice Byrnes took his seat on the
court October 6, 1941.' He resigned from judicial office on Octo-
ber 3, 1942. With one exception, his career on this bench is the
shortest in the history of the court.
2
The recorded work of Justice Byrnes can be found in volumes
314, 315 and 316 of the United States reports and a review of the
cases therein shows that he wrote sixteen opinions representing the
decision of the court. Although he authored no dissenting opinions,
he concurred in dissenting opinions of others on twelve occasions.
During this period, the court found no occasion to invalidate any act
of Congress, so there is no cause celebre to shed light on Justice
Byrnes' theory of constitutional government.
During the term of court in which justice Byrnes sat on the
bench, the United States entered World War II. justice Byrnes
was concerned that he could not be of more service to his country.
After argument of United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,3
a case heard two days after the attack on American ships at Pearl
Harbor, Justice Byrnes told the President that with the nation fac-
ing the greatest crisis in history and when he (Byrnes) was think-
ing so much about the ships at Pearl Harbor that it was difficult
to concentrate on arguments of counsel, the best he could do was
spend hours listening to argument over ships built in 1918. Half
in jest, he remarked to the President that justices of the Supreme
*A.B., LL.B., University of Pittsburgh; Member Pennsylvania Bar.
1. Named when sixty-two, justice Byrnes was one of the oldest men ever
appointed to the court.
2. Justice Byrnes served almost sixteen months but the term of Justice
Thomas Johnson, who served about six months, is shorter. John Rutledge
served approximately twelve months as associate justice and four months as
chief justice.
3. 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
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Court should not be appointed until they reached the age of seven-
ty, implying that they would in time of war be more content to
carry on the retiring life of a judge. The President took the jus-
tice seriously, for Mr. Roosevelt suggested a plan whereby war
legislation was to clear through the Attorney General and he asked
the Attorney General to consult with Justice Byrnes concerning it.
During the balance of the court term, Justice Byrnes, in addition to
court duties, consulted with congressional leaders and executive de-
partment officials regarding needed war legislation. 4 A precedent for
his extrajudicial work was available. Years before, Justice Charles
Evans Hughes had served as chairman of a commission created by
Congress to investigate second-class mail rates.
The court opinions of Justice Byrnes are not brief, cryptic or terse,
nor are they long and verbose. They can be termed opinions of
average length. Commencing with a statement of facts and proceed-
ing to the development of argument, the opinions demonstrate a
style of writing in which there is no striving for adornment, for
novel words, for epigrams. While his sentences are sometimes short
and staccato, there is variation and continuity in Justice Byrnes' le-
gal writing.
Two of Justice Byrnes' opinions deal with civil rights. Where
an ignorant Texas negro was charged with murder in one county
and without a warrant was taken by night and by day into other coun-
ties and persistently questioned in three different jails on three differ-
ent days until he "confessed", Justice Byrnes wrote an opinion de-
claring that this procedure was a denial of due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.5 Again, when a case
arose involving a law of Georgia making it a misdemeanor for one
not to perform work for which he was paid in advance, Justice
Byrnes said that the necessary consequence of the statute was that
one receiving an advance of pay for services he could not repay was
bound by threat of penal sanction to remain at work until the debt
was discharged. He pointed out that such coerced labor amounted
to "peonage" and was, therefore, a form of involuntary servitude
forbidden by the thirteenth amendment of the Constitution.
6
On the other hand, when federal agents in order to overhear con-
4. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 13. While Justice Byrnes no doubt felt him-
self capable of handling extra-judicial duties, it is apparent that Chief Justice
Stone was perturbed that a justice of the Supreme Court would undertake gov-
ernmental duties not having a direct relationship to the work of the court. (Let-
ter of Harlan Fiske Stone dated December 30, 1941 cited in HARVARD LAW
RTviaw, December 1953, p. 199.)
5. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
6. Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942).
[Vol. 6
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versations used a detectaphone which they placed against a wall of
defendant's office and thus procured evidence, justice Byrnes, al-
though he did not write the opinion, felt that this procedure did not
violate the fourth amendment of the Constitution and he voted with
the majority in a five-to-three decision.
7
In the field of interstate commerce, Justice Byrnes wrote one opini-
on and joined in one dissent. He wrote an opinion dealing with a
law of California making it a misdemeanor to bring into the state
any nonresident indigent person, the act being invoked with respect
to a defendant who brought his penniless brother-in-law from Texas
to California to live. Justice Byrnes reasoned that transportation
of an individual from one state to another was interstate commerce
and that the California law placed such a burden upon this commerce
that it was an unconstitutional interference. Mentioning that the
statute reflected the social phenomenon of large-scale interstate mi-
gration, he pointed out that this phenomenon did not admit of diverse
treatment by the several states. The matter was of national concern,
he declared, and the California law which was intended to prevent
migration was an invalid use of the state's police power.8
In another case involving interstate commerce, Justice Byrnes
approved the dissenting opinion. The case dealt with an Alabama
statute which authorized state inspection of packing stock butter
prior to its becoming an ingredient of renovated butter sent into
interstate commerce. Since renovated butter had been subjected to
federal regulation and taxation, a majority of the court decided that
state regulation authorized by Alabama was inconsistent with federal
law and that the state law was unconstitutional. Justice Byrnes felt
that the state law did not interfere with federal regulation of the
finished product and was one of four dissenters.9
In the field of labor relations, Justice Byrnes wrote two of the
court's opinions during this term. Where seamen on an American
ship berthed away from home at a port in Texas, in order to obtain
recognition of union demands, refused to obey orders and were dis-
charged, Justice Byrnes felt that their acts violated federal law regu-
lating crews at sea, that their discharge was justified and that under
the circumstances the National Labor Relations Board had no au-
thority to compel their re-employment. He said that it was suffici-
ent in this case to observe that the board had not been commissioned
to effectuate policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly
7. Goldman v. U. S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
8. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
9. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
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that it could wholly ignore other and equally important congressional
objectives.
"Frequently," said he, "the entire scope of Congressional purpose
calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another
and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it
undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis on its im-
mediate task."' 0
However, where a New York city truck drivers! union and its
members were convicted of conspiring to violate the federal anti-
racketeering law, Justice Byrnes wrote a majority opinion holding
that the statute did not proscribe traditional practices of unions and
that the conviction could not stand. The case resulted from efforts
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stable-
men and Helpers of America to compel out-of-town truckers to em-
ploy union men to drive out-of-town trucks in and about the city
of New York. It appeared that in a number of instances union mem-
bers by violence and threats forced truckers to pay sums of money
to the union in order to keep their trucks moving. Justice Byrnes
declared that since the purpose of the law was to prevent gangster-
ism and since the union tactics were such as could have been found
to be traditional among unions, it was improper for the trial court
not to have submitted to the jury the question whether the union ac-
tions were carried out along lines of recognized union activity. While
the acts of violence perpetrated by union men were not punishable
under the anti-racketeering law, he said bluntly that such acts were
subject to the ordinary criminal law."
A celebrated case before the court during Justice Byrnes' term
of service was Bridges v. California.12 In this case, it appeared
that a C. I. 0. union in California had been enjoined by court de-
cision from controlling or attempting to control a local union. While
the court was considering a C. I. 0. motion for new trial, Bridges, the
west coast director for the C. I. 0., sent a telegram to Secretary of
Labor Perkins declaring that attempted enforcement of the decision
would tie up the port of Los Angeles and involve the entire Pacific
coast and that his union did not intend to allow state courts to over-
ride a majority vote of union members. Bridges gave out this tele-
gram for publication in fiewspapers and was convicted of contempt
of court. A majority of the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
in a five-to-four decision. Although he did not write the dissenting
10. Southern Steamship Co. v. N. L. R. B., 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
11. U. S. v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
12. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
[Vol. 6
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opinion, Justice Byrnes voted with the minority on the theory that
although the fourteenth amendment embraced free speech and free
press, it recognized that the administration of justice should be im-
partial and one attribute of impartial justice was power of courts to
resist newspaper threats to pending decisions by punishing those who
made such threats.
Two of Justice Byrnes' opinions dealt with the question of priority
of debts and taxes due the United States from insolvents, and in
both opinions, he decided in favor of the government. In one opinion,
he concluded that a government tax on gasoline had priority over a
state tax on gasoline, notwithstanding the fact that the state law made
its gasoline taxes a preferred lien.'3 In a second opinion, he de-
cided that a debt due the government on a note had priority over
claims for wages.
14
In addition to those mentioned, Justice Byrnes wrote two opinions
dealing with war risk insurance,1 5 one opinion concerning social se-
curity taxes owed by a bankrupt corporation 16 and one opinion relat-
ing to the terms of a consent decree in an anti-trust case.1 7 None
of his opinions dealt with income tax, admiralty or patent law, but
he wrote a lengthy opinion concerning the land rights of the Sioux
Tribe of Indians in South Dakota and Nebraska.'
8
To Justice Byrnes, one custom of the court seemed of particular
value. Commenting on the custom of justices in shaking hands with
one another each day, Justice Byrnes said that the custom was of
great value in promoting good feeling in the conduct of court affairs.
Shortly before the October 1942 term of court began, President
Roosevelt asked Justice Byrnes to obtain a leave of absence, become
Director of Economic Stabilization and administer a law aimed at
strengthening the domestic economy-a law, incidentally, whose
passage Justice Byrnes had furthered. Justice Byrnes pointed out
that no one had power to give a justice of the Supreme Court a leave
of absence. Then he added:
"If you think this appointment is important to the prosecution of
the war, I will, without hesitation, resign from the Court and accept."
The President pressed the justice to take the post and the latter
13. U. S. v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
14. U. S. v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
15. Halliday v. U. S., 315 U.S. 94 (1942). U. S. v. Citizens Loan & Trust
Co., 316 U.S. 209 (1942).
16. U. S. v. New York, 315 U. S. 510 (1942).
17. Chrysler Corporation v. U. S., 316 U. S. 556 (1942).
18. Sioux Tribe v. U. S., 316 U.S. 317 (1942).
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agreed to accept it. Within an hour, his resignation from judicial
office was on its way to Mr. Roosevelt. 19
It was no easy task, commented Byrnes later, to leave the bench,
for he liked the work there and liked his associates for whom he
professed genuine respect and affection. He resigned, said he, from
a sense of duty. He felt that his becoming an official in the execu-
tive branch might aid the President to achieve the dream Woodrow
Wilson had for world peace.
Since his opinions deal with legislation which augmented federal
power, it might appear on superficial view that Justice Byrnes fa-
vored increased federal power. Actually, he was opposed to increased
federal power, but where federal legislation was under consideration,
he felt that his duty was to declare what the law was, and not what
it should be. The views he expressed were conservative ones, but
for a newcomer on the court, his record of dissents shows a high
degree of independence and his decisions appear as if he had long
been accustomed to the writing of judicial opinions.
19. Supra, note 4, p. 18.
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